Recherche – Detailansicht
Ausgabe: | Juni/2017 |
Spalte: | 605–607 |
Kategorie: | Altertumswissenschaft |
Autor/Hrsg.: | Ryu, Jang |
Titel/Untertitel: | Knowledge of God in Philo of Alexandria. |
Verlag: | Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2015. XIV, 311 S. = Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament. 2. Reihe, 405. Kart. EUR 89,00. ISBN 978-3-16-153006-7. |
Rezensent: | Orrey McFarland |
This book, a revised version of Jang Ryu’s Oxford dissertation, explores Philo of Alexandria’s theological epistemology by asking three main questions of his writings: what is the origin and nature of the human mind, what is its potential to know and experience God, and what are its limitations?
R.’s work is structured on a common division within Philo’s oeuvre, such that there are three series of works that Philo wrote, all of which had different intended audiences. Philo’s Quaestiones et solutiones were a form of catechetical material for Jewish students; his Allegorical Commentary was for more knowledgable Jewish audiences; and his »Exposition of the Law« was meant for a wider audience of both Jews and Gentiles.
R. does not explore the Quaestiones because of its weak textual base, but the distinction between the Allegorical Commentary and the »Exposition« is essential to the main argument of his work: »there are two distinct yet related theological epistemologies in Philo’s main series of exegetical writings« (22).
R. focuses first on the Allegorical Commentary. The impassible mind of God is the cause of everything that exists, including the human mind, which is defined against the divine; if the former is infinite, the latter is finite, and so on. This distinction should provoke humility within humans. Although God has gifted humans with a rational mind, and our rational faculty has some relation to divine reason, human minds exist within a non-rational soul. The mind has a divine parentage, and Philo can speak of divine »impregnation« as a way humans receive knowledge, but the mind is limited by its bodily context. The mind that aspires to know-ledge of the divine must therefore be perfected and purified (50–51). R. notes the mind’s limitations (which reflect also its nature): the mind is »ontologically limited«, as there is an unsurpassable gulf between the creator God and the created human. Likewise, the mind is both dependent on, and burdened by, the five senses, and it remains ignorant of the causes of the universe. Nevertheless, God is beneficent and desires for humans minds to aspire to the knowledge of him (though they cannot know God’s essence or have unmediated knowledge).
R. divides the next chapter into three sections which reflect the tripartite organization of the »Exposition« (cf. Praem. 1–3): crea-tion, patriarchs, and Moses (the Law). R. analyzes the three sections by applying his three main questions to each. In the creation sec-tion, R. focuses on Philo’s interpretation of Genesis 1.26–27 and 2.7, with its double presentation of the creation of the mind. R. teases out the distinct Platonic influence for both models of noetic ascent– the Phaedrus for 1.26–27, with its portrayal of the mind as »an imprint or copy of the mind of God,« and the Theaetetus for 2.7, wherein noetic ascent is presented as assimilation to God (147). In the patriarchs section, R. explains how Philo’s triad of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob represent three ways of noetic transformation – respectively, instruction, nature, and practice – that reflect the educational triad of the Greek philosophical tradition. In the final section, on Moses’ legislation, R. focuses on Philo’s depiction of Moses as Plato’s ideal philosopher-king. Moses is the perfect king, lawgiver, priest, and prophet, and this four-fold configuration provides Philo with four different, but related, ways of speaking about noetic ascent.
The next two chapters return to the Allegorical Exposition, with R. providing two »case studies« to flesh out important qualities of this distinctive epistemology. First, R. examines the language of initiation into divine mysteries, arguing that the language is used metaphorically and not literally. R. focuses on Philo’s interpretation of Cain in Genesis 4, wherein Philo uses the language of initiation to critique Cain, whom Philo presents as the father of the philosopher Protagoras. Moses’ portrayal of Cain, R. argues, is able to overcome the challenges of Protagoras’ relativistic epistemo-logy. Next, R. concentrates on Philo’s use of the language of divine inspiration. R. argues that when Philo is interpreting Genesis, Philo emphasizes how reason is »evicted« when the divine spirit comes upon a person’s mind. Rather differently, when interpret-ing Exodus, Philo talks about how the divine spirit enhances human reason in the noetic quest.
In his conclusion, R. summarizes his findings and points to overlapping areas of the »distinct yet related« epistemologies presented in the Allegorical Commentary and »Exposition« (divine incorporeality and incomprehensibility; divine mediation; human rationality). He also seeks to show where his work fits with previ-ous scholarship, where it breaks new ground, and where future research could be undertaken on related topics (e. g., on the sig-nificance of prayer in Philo’s epistemology).
This brief summary cannot cover all of the facets of R.’s rich exploration of Philo’s theological epistemology. R.’s work is clearly written, well versed in scholarship, and makes a contribution to Philo studies. However, a couple of questions can be asked about both the main thesis as well as how the argument is presented. First, although the nature of divine mediation is key to a study like this, R. spends insufficient time setting forth Philo’s understanding of the Logos, the Powers, the role they play in relation to humans, as well as how Philo is engaging with the ideas of Middle Platonism.
Second, in his conclusion R. points to where his work builds on previous scholarship or breaks new ground, but there is little detailed interaction throughout the body of the work that helps signal to the reader where R.’s work is novel. Third, while R.’s exploration of Philo’s epistemology in the Allegorical Commen-tary and the »Exposition« is helpful, his thesis that there are two epistemologies that are »distinct yet related« seems more assumed than argued for; in other words, it is not entirely clear why they must be considered distinct epistemologies rather than distinct presentations of one epistemology. One would expect that Philo could speak quite differently about the various related themes in the two bodies of work. R. shows how Philo can argue for the necessity of both the »obviation« and »intensification« of reason in the mind’s noetic aspiration – a potential problem or paradox R. does not answer as to whether Philo can solve (cf. 206). But if this still is considered as part of Philo’s one epistemology in the Allegorical Commentary, it is not immediately clear why the aspects of Philo’s epistemology in his two main bodies of work are »distinct« even while it is not proven that they are in some way incompatible. The main thesis could be defended further by including more discus-sion as to why Philo’s epistemology is not only presented differently in the Allegorical Commentary and »Exposition« – as one would expect, given the different intended audiences – but why also they must then be distinct epistemologies.
These questions notwithstanding, Ryu has made a careful examination of an important theme in scholarship on Philo of Alexandria and his work should provoke further study and debate; I will return to this book often.